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We develop a dynamic model of sovereign default and renegotiation to study
how expectations of default and debt restructuring in the near future aﬀect
the ex ante maturity structure of sovereign debts. This paper argues that the
average maturity is shorter when a country is approaching ﬁnancial distress due
to two risks: default risk and “debt dilution” risk. Long-term yield is generally
higher than short-term yield to reﬂect the higher default risk incorporated in
long-term debts. When default risk is high and long-term debt is too expensive
to aﬀord, the country near default has to rely on short-term debt. The second
risk, “debt dilution” risk, is the focus of this paper. It arises because there is no
explicit seniority structure among diﬀerent sovereign debts, and all debt holders
are legally equal and expect to get the same haircut rate in the post-default debt
restructuring. Therefore, new debt issuances around crisis reduce the amount
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1that can be recovered by existing earlier debt-holders in debt restructuring, and
thus “dilute” existing debts. As a result, investors tend to hold short-term debt
which is more likely to mature before it is “diluted” to avoid the “dilution” risk.
Model features non-contingent bonds of two maturities, endogenous default and
endogenous hair cut rate in a debt renegotiation after default. We show that
“debt dilution” eﬀect is always present and is more severe when default risk is
high. When default is a likely event in the near future, both default risk and
“dilution” risk drive the ex ante maturity of sovereign debts to be shorter. In a
quantitative analysis, We try to calibrate the model to match various features
of the recent crisis episode of Argentina. In particular, we try to account for
the shifts in maturity structure before crisis and the volatility of long-term and
short-term spreads observed in the prior default episode of Argentina.
Keywords: Maturity Structure, Debt Dilution, Sovereign Default, Debt Renego-
tiation
1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed recurrent large-scale sovereign debt crises in many
emerging markets, and most of them were resolved by debt renegotiations after de-
fault. These observances have aroused much interest in how composition and maturity
structure of sovereign debts aﬀect a country’s default probability and debt renegoti-
ation outcome1.
However, few have studied this problem the other way around. That is, when
1For example, many authors (Cole and Kehoe (1996), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), Furman
and Stiglitz (1998), etc.) have argued that excessive reliance on short-term debt increases a country’s
vulnerability to sudden capital reversals and liquidity crisis, and aﬀects the depth of crisis when it
happens.
2an emerging market is near ﬁnancial distress, how do expectations of future default
and debt renegotiations aﬀect sovereign debt composition and maturity structure ex
ante? This paper aims to answer this question and in particular, we study the eﬀects
of expected future default and debt restructuring on the ex ante maturity structure
of sovereign debts.
It is already a well documented fact that the maturity structure of emerging
market debt issuances correlates with their domestic conditions. That is, emerging
markets issue long-term debts more in tranquil times, and issue short-term debts
more when they are near crisis. Long-term spread is generally higher than short-term
spread and this diﬀerence increases as the country approaches crisis (Broner, Loren-
zoni and Schumukler (2005)). This paper constructs a dynamic model of sovereign
borrowing, default and renegotiation to explain why expectations of default and debt
restructuring in the near future drive the ex ante average debt maturity to be shorter.
In this model, we emphasize two risks that aﬀect debt maturity structure: default risk
and “debt dilution” risk. Default risk comes from the well-known willingness-to-pay
problem and long-term debts usually bear higher default risk than short-term debts,
since the latter are more likely to mature before crisis actually happens. Therefore,
long-term spreads are generally higher than short-term spreads and the diﬀerences are
even larger when default probability is high. Long-term debts can be too expensive
to aﬀord when a country is around crisis, and the country has to rely on short-term
debts.
In addition to default risk, we go further and analyze another risk, which has not
been studied much in the literature: “debt dilution” risk. “Debt dilution” risk arises
when default is resolved by debt restructuring in an environment without explicit
seniority structure among diﬀerent types of sovereign debts2. In such an environment,
2Although there are no legally binding priority rules, most sovereigns do respect a number of in-
formal rules. Debt from creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, and other multilateral development
3most sovereign debts rank as legally equal or, pari passu, and all debt holders expect
to get the same haircut rate during the post-default debt restructuring. Thus, new
debt issuances before crisis reduce the amount that can be recovered by existing
debt-holders in a debt renegotiation in case of default, and hence, “dilute” existing
debts. That is, each new debt issuance incurs a potential capital loss to existing debt
holders. This “debt dilution” eﬀect is always present whenever a country issues new
debt, but it becomes a main concern to investors only when default risk is high and
debt restructuring is a likely event. Country around ﬁnancial distress has incentive to
issue large amount of new debts in order to postpone or to avoid crisis, and it is able
to do so to some extent, since new creditors will not charge prohibitive interest rates
given that they can eﬀectively obtain a share of the existing creditors debt recovery
value. As a result, existing debts can be “diluted” intensively when the country is
around crisis. In order to forestall debt dilution, investors tend to hold short-term
debt when crisis is around the corner.
In the model, a risk-averse country and risk-neutral competitive international
investors trade short-term and long-term bonds. Facing a stochastic endowment
stream, the country chooses to repay or to default optimally. Default results in
exclusion from international capital markets and proportional output loss, but it
can be resolved by debt renegotiation between the country and its debt holders. If
agreement of debt reduction is reached, all debt holders get the same haircut rate
and by repaying the reduced amount of debt, the country regains access to capital
markets. The endogenously determined haircut rate aﬀects the country’s ex ante
default probability. And expected default probability and debt haircut rate together
banks (MDBs) almost always has de facto seniority, in part because these international ﬁnancial
institutions (IFIs) usually reﬁnance their maturing debt rather than demand full payment after a
default. Trade credits also enjoy de facto seniority. In this paper, however, we focus on privately
held sovereign bonds, among which there are no formal or informal priority rules.
4aﬀect the ex ante average maturity and bond spreads of diﬀerent maturities.
We analytically characterize the model equilibrium and establish that “debt di-
lution” eﬀect is always present and is most severe when default risk is high. And
when default is a likely event, both default risk and “dilution” risk drive the ex ante
maturity of sovereign debts to be shorter. In a quantitative analysis, We try to cali-
brate the model to match various features of the recent crisis episode of Argentina. In
particular, we try to account for the shifts in maturity structure before crisis and the
volatility of long-term and short-term spreads observed in the prior default episode
of Argentina.
This paper builds on several strands of literature. One strand of literature studies
the impacts of debt renegotiation in event of sovereign default. Bulow and Rogoﬀ
(1989b) present a model with continuous debt renegotiation, through which direct
sanctions can be lifted. Yue (2005) models debt renegotiation explicitly and charac-
terize the endogenously determined debt recovery schedule. Our paper studies the
impacts of debt renegotiation from a diﬀerent perspective and analyzes how debt
renegotiations aﬀects ex ante debt maturity structure.
The second strand of literature is on seniority structure and debt dilution eﬀect.
Debt dilution problem was initially addressed in corporate ﬁnance literature by Fama
and Miller (1972). White (1980) and Schwartz (1989) then explore the optimal se-
niority structure in the corporate debt context. Hart (1995), Hart and Moore (1995)
argues that debt dilution problem in corporate ﬁnance arises mainly due to the agency
problem, but not the absence of explicit priority rules, since seniority structure does
exist in corporate debts by contract or statute. In sovereign debt context, the role
of seniority structure has been analyzed by Detragiache (1994), Roubini and Setser
(2004), among others. Dooley (2000) and Saravia (2003) study the conﬂict between
oﬃcial and private lenders in the competition for repayments. Formal studies on
debt dilution eﬀect, however, are relatively underdeveloped. Cohen (1991) presents a
53-period model of sovereign debt dilution and notes the resulting ineﬃciency. Bolton
and Jeanne (2004) is closely related to this paper and they argue that debt dilution
problem led to the shift in sovereign debt composition from bank loans to bonds
from 1980s to 1990s. However, the above papers on debt dilution problem are based
on a static one-shot borrowing framework. Therefore, a country’s consideration for
its future access to capital markets and consumption smoothing plays no role in the
renegotiation. Our paper improves on this point by incorporating endogenous default
and renegotiation into an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic model and studies their impacts
on ex ante debt maturity structure.
This paper is also related to Arellano (2005) and Broner, Lorenzoni and Schumuk-
ler (2005), both of which study the optimal maturity structure of sovereign debts.
Arellano (2005) focuses on the default risk and analyzes the role of long-term bor-
rowing. While this paper focuses on an additional risk: “debt dilution” risk, which
interacts with default risk and both of them aﬀect ex ante maturity structure. Broner,
Lorenzoni and Schumukler (2005) places more emphasis on the lender’s side. They
assume risk-averse lenders and argue that short-term debts do not include compen-
sation for varying short rate when lenders face liquidity needs, and thus short-term
debts are cheaper. That’s why emerging markets borrow short term around crisis.
Our framework focuses on the borrower’s side and bond spreads in this model reﬂect
the endogenous default probability and debt recovery rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model
environment is described and sovereign country’s problem, renegotiation problem and
investors’ problem are discussed in details in three subsections. We then deﬁne the
model equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium properties in section 3. Section 4
provides our plan of model calibration and quantitative analysis. The proofs are in
the Appendix.
62 The Model Environment
Model features 2 types of agents: a small open economy and inﬁnite number of in-
ternational investors. In each period, the economy receives a stochastic stream of
non-storable consumption goods yt. The stochastic endowment yt is drawn from a
compact set Y , and µ(yt|yt−1) is the probability distribution function of a shock yt con-
ditional on the previous realization yt−1. The sovereign government of this economy
is risk averse and aims to maximize the expected lifetime utility of a representative






where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and ct denotes the consumption in period t.
The period utility function u(ct) is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and satisﬁes the Inada conditions.
International investors are risk neutral and behave competitively on the interna-
tional capital markets. They can borrow whatever amount they want in the interna-
tional capital markets at the world risk-free interest rate r, which we assume to be
a constant. And their borrowing and lending cannot aﬀect the risk-free interest rate
r. Investors have perfect information on the country’s asset holdings and endowment
streams. When the sovereign government issues bonds, an investor will be randomly
chosen to trade with the government.
Capital markets are incomplete. The sovereign government and international
investors can only trade non-contingent zero-coupon bonds with short (one-period)
and long (two periods) maturities. The face value of a discount bond issued in period
t and maturing in period s is denoted as bt
s, which is the amount to be repaid in
period s, and s can be t + 1 or t + 2. If bt
s is positive, then it’s a saving by the
government; if it’s negative, then it’s a borrowing from investors. The price of a bond
with face value bt
s is denoted as qt
s, which is a function of current endowment ys, bond
7face value bt
s and the value of other existing bonds. Bond prices will be determined
in equilibrium and the explicit price function will be described in details later.
Furthermore, we assume that investors always commit to repay their debts, while
the sovereign government can choose to default on its debts rather than repay in
full, whenever the former generates higher expected lifetime utility. We assume that
once the government defaults, it defaults on all existing debts. Default is costly
in two ways: one is that when the country is in default, it suﬀers a proportional
output loss, γy, since defaulting country may not obtain advanced technology, direct
investment, or foreign aid from other countries, which reduces its output3; the other
cost is that default incurs exclusion from international capital markets, and thus the
country cannot save or borrow in capital markets while it’s in default4. However,
ﬁnancial exclusion in this model can be temporary instead of being permanent as
in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). The defaulting country can regain access to the
international capital markets after debt restructuring. That is, it can renegotiate
with its debt holders about a debt reduction5. Once renegotiation agreement has
been reached and the government repays the reduced debt arrears in full, it can
return to the international capital markets with a clean record. So in this model,
regaining access to the international capital markets is endogenous, depending on the
renegotiation process, the total amount of defaulted debt and the country’s streams
of output. Thus, this paper is distinct from models with an exogenous probability for
the defaulting country to re-access capital markets, as studied in Arellano (2005) and
Aguiar and Gopinath (2004). We use a discrete state variable s = {0,1} to denote
the country’s credit standing at the beginning of each period. If s = 0, it means that
3Reputation spillover analyzed in Cole and Kehoe (1998) also lead to output loss.
4This assumption can be rationalized if the creditors can seize the country’s assets accumulated
in the default periods, or the creditors can collude, as in Wright (2002).
5In the real life, debt restructurings can be quite complicated. Here for simplicity, we assume
that debt restructuring takes its simplest form, debt reduction.
8the country inherits a good credit standing from the last period, and it’s current on
its debt service. If s = 1, then the country is in default and inherits a bad credit
standing from the last period. Then the government needs to renegotiate with debt
holders in this period in order to settle its defaulted debt. If the government and the
debt holders never reach agreement, then the country stays in autarky forever. In the
next 3 subsections, we describe the sovereign government’s problem, renegotiation
process and investors’ problem in details.
2.1 Sovereign government’s Problem
At the beginning of period t, an endowment shock yt realizes, and the country inherits
a credit standing st and a set of existing assets Bt from the last period. Bt consists
of 3 bonds: the long-term bond issued 2 periods ago, b
t−2
t , the short-term bond
issued in the last period, b
t−1
t , and the long-term bond issued in the last period,
b
t−1
t+1. Let V (yt,st,Bt) be the country’s lifetime value function from period t on with
current endowment yt, credit standing st and set of existing assets Bt. The sovereign
government makes decisions depending on the current states.
If s = 0, then the country has a good credit standing and the amount of maturing
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t are savings, it’s obviously the case that the government doesn’t default
since it won’t refuse to receive payments from international investors. However, when one of them
is a saving and the other is a debt, one option might be the government defaults on its debt while
getting returns from its savings. But this situation is ruled out in this model by assuming that once
the government defaults, it defaults on all its assets. So when saving is enough to cover maturing
debt, it’s optimal for the government to repay debt and receive returns from its savings.
9thus, its value function is
V (yt,0,Bt) = max{V
R,V
D} (2)









t < 0 and the government chooses to repay). Then it
becomes a standard consumption-saving problem. That is, the government repays
its maturing debt (or receive net payments from international investors) and then
decide how much short-term and long-term bonds to issue in this period. And then






u(ct) + βEV (yt+1,0,Bt+1) (3)































t+2,Bt) are prices corresponding to the
short-term and long-term bonds. Bt+1 is the set of existing assets at the beginning
of period t + 1.
If the government chooses to default, then its value function V D is given by
V
D(yt,0,Bt) = u(ct) + βEV (yt+1,1,Bt+1) (4)





t )(1 + r) + b
t−1
t+1
We assume that once the government defaults, it defaults on all its existing debts,
including debts maturing today and debts maturing in the future. In addition, the
defaulting country suﬀers a proportional output loss γyt, and it cannot save or borrow
10while it is in default. Thus, consumption in this period is only (1 − γ)yt and the
country enters the next period with a bad credit standing and defaulted debt Bt+1.
When the country is in default, B is no longer a vector of existing debts, instead, it’s
the present value of all defaulted debt.
If the country starts a period with a bad credit standing s = 1, it means that the
government defaulted in some previous period and the defaulted debt has not been
settled yet. Then in this period, the sovereign government negotiates with its debt
holders for a debt reduction and tries to determine an endogenous haircut rate (1 −
α(y,B). In other words, |α(y,B)B| is the amount of debt the sovereign government
has to repay in order to settle its defaulted debt, according to the renegotiation
agreement. Potentially, the defaulting country can choose to stay in autarky instead
of initiating a debt renegotiation. In this model, staying in autarky corresponds to
the case that the government always initiates a debt renegotiation but never agrees on
any haircut rate. Since it is assumed that debt renegotiation incurs no cost to either
the sovereign government or to the debt holders, and both parties are indiﬀerent
between participating or not participating in it. What matters here is whether or not
an agreement can be reached and then be carried out. Therefore, we assume that
defaulting country and its debt holders always participate in debt renegotiation but
they can choose when to reach agreement and what the haircut rate is.
If agreement has been reached in the current period, then the country repays its
reduced debt arrears according to the agreement, and the value function is
V (yt,1,Bt) = u((1 − γ)yt + αt(yt,Bt)Bt) + βEV (yt+1,0,0) (5)
Thus, the country still suﬀers an output loss γyt and repays reduced debt arrears
αt(yt,Bt)Bt. Then it enters the next period with a good credit standing and no
debt arrear. αt(yt,Bt) is determined endogenously in the debt renegotiation, which
is modeled explicitly in subsection 2.2.
11In case that no agreement has been reached this period, both parties enter the next
period and continue negotiation. Then the value function of the sovereign government
is
V (yt,1,Bt) = u((1 − γ)yt) + βEV (yt+1,1,(1 + r)Bt) (6)
The country consumes (1 − γ)yt, cannot borrow or save, and enters the next period
with still a bad credit standing and unpaid debt arrears Bt+1 = (1 + r)Bt.
Default is optimal for the sovereign government when V D ≥ V R. So given debt
position B, we can deﬁne the default set yD(B) ⊆ Y . This is a set of endowment
shocks under which default is optimal given debt position B.
y
D(B) = {y ∈ Y : V
D(y,0,B) ≥ V
R(y,0,B)}
We can also deﬁne the probability of default θ(B) as the probability that the endow-
ment shock falls into the default set given debt position B.
θ(Bt) = Pr{yt ⊆ y
D(Bt)}
Since B consists of both debts maturing in the current period and debt maturing in
the future, the probability of default θ(Bt) is aﬀected not only by the total stock of
debt, but also by the composition of debt, i.e., how much maturing debt relative to
the total stock of debt. Hence choices of maturity structure have important eﬀect on
the probability of default, and changes in the probability of default, in turn, aﬀects
choices of ex ante maturity structure.
2.2 Debt Renegotiation Problem
Once the sovereign government and its debt-holders enter the stage of debt renego-
tiation, they need to determine an endogenous debt recovery rate α(y,B) ∈ [0,1]
(or a haircut rate (1 − α(y,B)) ∈ [0,1]), given the current endowment shock y and
12defaulted debt B. We model this renegotiation problem using Nash Bargaining7. Be-
cause of the static nature of Nash Bargaining, the outcome of this bargaining game is
either agreeing on a positive debt recovery rate immediately (α > 0) or never reach-
ing agreement (α = 0)8. Never reaching agreement is the threat point of the game,
in which case the country stays in autarky forever and its debt holders receive no
repayment at all. Since there is no explicit seniority structure among diﬀerent debt
issues and thus all debt holders should be treated legally equally, we assume that
debt holders all get the same haircut rate, and they can behave like a representative
debt holder in the post-default renegotiation9.








That is, the country faces a proportional output loss every period and has no access
to capital markets. We denote the country’s surplus in the Nash bargaining by ∆B,
which is the diﬀerence between the expected value of accepting some optimal positive
debt recovery rate αt and the expected value of rejecting it (and thus stays in autarky
7We assume Nash Bargaining mainly because it keeps the model tractable. And furthermore,
equilibrium obtained in Nash Bargaining can be supported by more complicated and realistic game
structures, such as the continuous bargaining Rubinstein game. Therefore, Nash Bargaining is a
reasonable benchmark to model renegotiation problem.
8By using Nash Bargaining we cannot generate delays in reaching renegotiation agreement, which
we always observed in the real life. While in this model, the focus is not to study delays occurring
in debt renegotiation. All we need from debt renegotiation problem is the endogenous debt recovery
rate α, and Nash Bargaining is enough to generate a close approximation of that debt recovery rate.
My second project is focused on studying delays in debt renegotiation after default, where we use a
more complicated and realistic game structure to model debt renegotiation.
9By that assumption, we rule out the strategic “hold-outs” behavior of creditors in the post-
default debt renegotiation. This assumption is reasonable here, since the interests of all creditors
are perfectly in line with each other.
13forever).




i−tu((1 − γ)yi) (7)
This surplus can be positive because by accepting a positive debt recovery rate, the
country suﬀers output loss and being excluded from the international capital markets
just temporarily, instead of permanently, as in the case of staying in autarky forever.
The reservation value for the representative debt holder is 0, i.e., the value of
receiving no repayment. And thus, the surplus to the debt holder is the present value
of recovered debt. Let ∆L denotes the representative creditor’s surplus, and it’s given
by
∆L(yt,Bt,αt) = −αtBt (8)
The debt holder has positive surplus as long as a positive debt recovery rate can
be agreed upon. And how the total surplus is divided between the country and
debt holders depend on their bargaining powers. The bargaining power parameter
captures all institutional factors in the renegotiation in a simple way. The higher
bargaining power one party has, the more surplus it can extract. We denote the
country’s bargaining power as φ ∈ [0,1], and then the debt holder’s bargaining power





s.t. ∆B(yt,Bt,αt) ≥ 0
∆L(yt,Bt,αt) ≥ 0
2.3 International Investors’ Problem
International investors are risk neutral and behave competitively. In each period, if
the sovereign government has a good credit standing and repays its maturing debts
14in full, it can trade with a randomly chosen international investor via one-period and
two-period bonds. In period t, taking the bond price functions as given, the chosen













t are proﬁts from short-term and long-term bonds, respectively. More

























t+1 ≥ 0, the sovereign government is the lender and there is no default risk
since the investor always repays his debt. While in the other case, the sovereign
government is the borrower and there is default risk. θt+1 denotes the probability of
default in period t+1. If the government defaults in period t+1, then it initiates debt
renegotiation in period t + 2. Because of the assumption of Nash Bargaining in debt
renegotiation, agreement is always reached in period t + 2. And thus, αt+2 denotes
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t+1 ≥ 0, there is no default risk, and then the price of short-term sovereign
bond is equal to that of a risk-free bond, 1
1+r. When the country is the borrower
bt
t+1 < 0, there exist risks of default and debt restructuring. Then the sovereign bond
is priced to compensate the lenders for bearing both risks. By the same token, prices















We deﬁne the recursive equilibrium of this model as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. A recursive equilibrium is a list of allocations for (i) consumption
c(y,s,B), short-term bond holdings b1(y,B), long-term bond holdings b2(y,B), default
set yD(B); (ii) pricing function for short-term bonds q1(y,b1,B) and pricing function
for long-term bonds q2(y,b2,B); (iii) debt recovery rate α(y,B) such that:
1. Taking as given the short-term and long-term bonds’ pricing functions q1(y,b1,B)
and q2(y,b2,B), as well as the debt renegotiation outcome α(y,B), the country’s
asset holdings b1(y,B), b2(y,B), consumption c(y,s,B) and default set yD(B)
satisfy the sovereign government’s optimization problem.
2. Given the renegotiation outcome α(y,B) and the sovereign country’s optimal
policy, the bond pricing functions q1(y,b1,B) and q2(y,b2,B) satisﬁes investors’
maximization problem.
3. Given the bond pricing functions q1(y,b1,B) and q2(y,b2,B), the debt recovery
rate α(y,B) solves the post-default debt renegotiation problem.
163.1 Properties of Equilibrium
We ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium debt recovery rate in case of default.
Proposition 1. As long as the sovereign government’s bargaining power φ ∈ [0,1),
the equilibrium debt recovery rate α∗(y,B) is always positive.
Proof. See Appendix. 
If the sovereign government has all the bargaining power, φ = 1, then it will get
complete debt reduction, and thus the equilibrium debt recovery rate α∗ = 0. As
we have discussed above, when the country chooses to stay in autarky, α∗ is also
zero. However, the complete debt reduction case is diﬀerent from that of staying in
autarky, because in the former case, the country regain access to the capital markets
without repaying anything, and complete debt reduction is a renegotiation agreement;
while in the latter case, the country faces permanent proportional output loss and
permanent exclusion from the capital markets, and α∗ = 0 is due to no agreement
being achieved. So ex post, if the government has all the bargaining power in a debt
renegotiation, it can experience complete debt relief. But ex ante, the extremely
strong position of the country in debt renegotiation will greatly limit the country’s
ability to borrow, and the country’s debt level cannot be higher than the expected
proportional output loss in case of default. In the other extreme, when the represen-
tative debt holder has all the bargaining power, it will extract the total surplus and
get such a large repayment that the county is indiﬀerent between accepting it and
rejecting it. However, we never observed the above two extreme cases happening.
The more realistic case is that φ ∈ (0,1), that is both parties have some bargaining
powers and the equilibrium debt recovery rate is always positive. The debt holders
obviously welcome a positive repayment after default, and the country is also willing
to repay some of its defaulted debt in order to avoid permanent output loss and have
the chance to smooth consumption in the future. Thus, when φ ∈ [0,1), agreeing
17upon a positive debt recovery rate is mutually beneﬁcial. This result shows that debt
restructuring in case of default is a rational choice for both sovereign borrower and
its debt holders, and thus allowing debt renegotiation in case of default is a more
reasonable assumption than the traditional assumption of permanent exclusion after
default.
Since the equilibrium debt recovery rate is determined endogenously in debt rene-
gotiation, it is a function of current endowment shock and defaulted debt. The next
proposition characterize the equilibrium amount of debt recovery.
Proposition 2. For all y and B, there exists a threshold debt recovery value B(y),






B(y) if B ≤ B(y)
B if B > B(y)
Proof. See Appendix. 
This proposition says when the size of defaulted debt is smaller than the threshold
value B(y), the country has to repay all its defaulted debt even after debt renegoti-
ation. While when the size of defaulted debt is larger than the threshold value, the
country only needs to repay the threshold value B(y). This result is obtained because
the sovereign government and the debt holders actually care about the absolute size
of debt recovery, and due to Nash Bargaining, there is only one optimal value of debt
recovery B(y) (interior solution) that maximizes the total surplus, and this optimal
value of debt recovery is independent of defaulted debt. This proposition can be used
to establish the existence of debt dilution eﬀect, which is illustrated more clearly by
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For all y and B1 ≤ B2 < 0, the equilibrium debt recovery rate satisﬁes
α∗(y,B1) ≤ α∗(y,B2).
18Proof. See Appendix. 
This corollary is an immediate result from Proposition 2. It says that the recovery
rate is (weakly) decreasing in the amount of defaulted debt. Or in simpler words, the
more a sovereign government owes, the (weakly) smaller proportion the government
needs to repay in a debt restructuring after default. This corollary demonstrates
that the sovereign government enjoys larger haircut rate in the post-default debt
restructuring if it defaults with higher level of debt, and this gives the government
incentive to issue more debt when it is very near crisis. However, to the existing debt
holders, each new debt issue reduces the debt recovery rate in the debt restructuring
after default, and thus “dilutes” their debt holdings.
The debt dilution eﬀect illustrated in corollary 1 is largely consistent with what we
have observed in the recent sovereign bond exchanges. The following table shows the
scale of debt crises and debt recovery rates for Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Russia,
and Argentina. The debt recovery rate is lower for a higher level of defaulted debt,
both in dollar amount and relative to the country’s output. Thus the model prediction
is in line with the empirical observations.
Country Pakistan Ukraine Russia Ecuador Argentina
Time of default Dec. 98 Sep. 98 Nov. 98 Aug. 99 Nov. 01
Defaulted debt (billion $) 0.75 2.7 73 6.6 82.3
Defaulted debt/output 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.46 0.32
Debt recovery rate 100% 100% 64% 60% 30%
Note: Data are from World Bank, Moody’s (2003) and Yue(2005).
A last remark regarding results obtained in Proposition 2 is that the simple and
clean form of debt recovery function is obtained due to the assumption of Nash Bar-
gaining, as we have explained above10. We may get diﬀerent debt recovery function if
10Yue(2005) obtained similar results by using Nash Bargaining, though the purpose of that paper
19we use diﬀerent bargaining structure. However, Nash Bargaining outcome can serve
as a benchmark in which the debt dilution eﬀect is the smallest. Because in Nash
Bargaining, both parties are cooperative and maximize the total surplus, that is, the
sovereign government also cares about the debt holders’ surplus and vice versa. Note
that the country’s surplus function is concave and the debt holders’ surplus function
is linear, so the country needs to “sacriﬁce” a lot and choose a relatively big α∗ in
order to maximize the total surplus. As a result, the investors’ debt holdings are not
diluted too much under Nash Bargaining. While in more realistic bargaining struc-
tures, when agents are non-cooperative and only care about their own surpluses, the
sovereign government may achieve higher surplus by choosing a smaller α∗ in expense
of its debt holders’ surplus, and in that case the investors’ debt holdings are diluted
more severely.
Debt dilution eﬀect is present whenever the sovereign government issues new debt,
but it is a big concern only when default probability is very high. We then proceed
to characterize factors that aﬀect the default probability. Let BM denote the amount















Proposition 3. Given the equilibrium debt recovery rate α∗(y,B), for B1M ≤ B2M <
0 and B1T = B2T, if default is optimal for B2M then default is also optimal for B1M.
For B1M = B2M and B1T ≤ B2T < 0, if default is optimal for B2T then default is
also optimal for B1T.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The ﬁrst half of the proposition predicts that given the same total level of debt,
the sovereign government is more inclined to default with larger amount of maturing
debt. Therefore, maturity structure matters here. For example, if the country doesn’t
is not about debt dilution eﬀect.
20change the total amount of debt issues BT, while increasing the ratio of short-term
bonds to long-term bonds, then in the next period BM is going to be higher though BT
doesn’t change, and the default probability is higher. Hence, more reliance on short-
term debt increases the probability of default. The second half of the proposition
predicts that with the same amount of maturing debt, the government tends to default
with larger level of total debt stock. This result is consistent with that obtained in
existing literature (such as Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Chatterjee et al. (2002),
Arellano (2004) and Yue (2005)), though in those models there are only one-period
bonds, and the result reduces to that default probability increases in the level of debt.
In summary, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Default probability is increasing in both BM and BT.
Next, we compare the default probabilities in two situations: when post-default
debt renegotiation is possible and when debt renegotiation is not possible, given the
same amount of maturing debt and total debt.
Proposition 4. Given the same BM and BT, if default is optimal when debt renego-
tiation is not possible (α∗ = 0), then default is also optimal when debt renegotiation
is possible (α∗ > 0).
Proof. See Appendix. 
When post-default renegotiation is a possible option, the sovereign government is
more inclined to default than in the case that default is always followed by staying
in autarky forever. This is because permanent exclusion from the capital markets is
a more severe penalty than debt restructuring in case of default. First, with debt
restructuring, the defaulting country is only temporarily excluded from the capital
markets and it’s able to smooth consumption as soon as it repays the reduced amount
of debt. Furthermore, the country suﬀers the output loss only when it’s in default.
While if the country has to stay in autarky forever after default, both output loss and
21exclusion from capital markets are permanent. Thus, by taking into consideration
of the endogenous debt restructuring after default, this model can generate higher
equilibrium default probability than existing sovereign debt models without debt
renegotiation. While failure to generate equilibrium default probability comparable
to data is one of the main weaknesses of existing sovereign debt models.
4 Quantitative Analysis (Incomplete)
4.1 Calibration
We plan to solve this model numerically to evaluate its quantitative predictions on
the maturity structure of sovereign bonds with default risk and debt dilution risk.
Parameters in the model are calibrated to match certain features of the sovereign
debt of Argentina.





where σ is the risk aversion coeﬃcient and it’s set to 2, which is a commonly used
value in real business cycle studies. We assume that the exogenous endowment stream
follows an AR(1) process:
yt = y + ρ(yt−1 − y) + εt, ε ∼ N(0,σ
2
ε)
ρ and σε will be estimated to Argentine quarterly output (from MECON), which are
de-trended and normalized such that y = 1. The proportional output loss parameter
γ is set to 2% , which is consistent with that estimated by Sturzenegger (2002).
The risk- free interest rate r is set to 1%, the average quarterly interest rates on 3
month US treasury bills. The last two parameters are the time discount factor β and
22the sovereign government’s bargaining power θ. The discount factor β will calibrated
across experiments so that the default probability in the limiting distribution matches
the average default frequency of Argentina. From 1824 to 1999, Argentina defaulted
5 times (Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003) report four sovereign default episodes
of Argentina from 1824 to 1999. And Argentina defaulted the ﬁfth time in 2001).
Then the average default frequency in Argentina is 0.69% quarterly. The bargaining
power θ will be calibrated to match Argentina’s average debt recovery rate in the most
recent debt restructuring, which is 28% according to Moody’s (2003). The following
table summarizes parameter values estimated and to be estimated.
Parameter Symbol Value
Coeﬃcient of Risk Aversion σ 2
Risk Free Interest Rate r 1%
Output Loss in Default γ 2%
Mean Endowment y 1
Std. Dev. of Endowment shock σε to be estimated
Autocorr. Coef. of Endowment ρ to be estimated
Discount Factor β to be estimated
Borrower’s Bargaining Power φ to be estimated
4.2 Solution Algorithm
The following algorithm outlines the procedures we plan to use to compute the equi-
librium of the model.
First, we discretize the spaces of asset holdings and endowment. The limits of
the asset space and endowment space are set to ensure that the limits do not bind in
equilibrium and big deviations of shocks are possible. We approximate the distribu-
tion of endowment shocks by a discrete Markov transition matrix using a quadrature
based procedure (Hussey and Tauchen 1991).
23Then, we guess an initial debt recovery schedule α0 = 1. Given the initial debt
recovery rate α0, guess an initial price of short-term bonds qs
0 = 1
1+r, and an initial
price of long-term bonds ql
0 = 1
(1+r)2.
Thirdly, given initial guess of α0 and prices qs
0 and ql
0, solve the country’s opti-
mization problem when it repays debt. We use the Bellman equation iteration to
ﬁnd out the value function V R
0 . And then we compute the optimal default choice by
comparing V R
0 and V D
0 , and also get the default set. From the default set and initial
guess of recovery rate, we can compute the new short-term and long-term prices qs
1
and ql
1. If the new prices are suﬃciently close to the old one, stop iterating on prices
and go on, otherwise repeat this step until prices converge.
Fourthly, solve the bargaining problem given the converged prices and compute
the new debt recovery schedule α1 for all y, BM and BT. If the new recovery schedule
is suﬃciently close to the old one, stop iterating. Otherwise, go back to the last step.
4.3 Simulation
We will feed the endowment process to the model and conduct simulations to explore
the behavior of the model economy in the stationary distribution.
First, we will compare the model statistics with data statistics. These statistics
include average and volatility of interest rates of diﬀerent maturities, relation between
bond spreads, outputs and current accounts.
We then can do the following experiments: plot the time series dynamics of the
model prior to a default episode in two cases. One is with debt renegotiation after
default and the other without debt renegotiation after default. We would like to
compare the shift in maturity structures (changes in the ratio of short-term bonds
over long-term bonds), changes in the interest rates of short-term bonds and long-
term bonds in the above two cases. This experiment is aim to show that sovereign
bonds will be biased to short-term bonds in prior crisis episode in the ﬁrst case, due
24to default risk only; and the maturity structure will be biased even more to short-
term bonds in the second case in which post-default renegotiation exists, due to the
debt dilution eﬀect. We also aim to show that in general long-term interest rate
is higher than short-term interest rate, and before crisis this diﬀerence can be even
larger, which reﬂects both higher default risk and debt dilution risk incorporated in
long-term bonds.
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28A appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The debt renegotiation problem is
α∗(yt,Bt) = argmax∆B(yt,Bt,αt)φ∆L(yt,Bt,αt)1−φ
s.t. ∆B(yt,Bt,αt) = u((1 − γ)yt + αtBt) + β












L u0((1 − γ)yt + α∗





First, let’s consider the case that ∆B 6= 0 and ∆L 6= 0. From the above ﬁrst order condition,
we know that the interior solution is given by
φ∆Lu0((1 − γ)yt + α∗
tBt) = (1 − φ)∆B (16)
Obviously, the interior solution cannot be α∗ = 0, otherwise the above equation cannot hold
with equality. Then let’s consider the case that ∆B = 0. This is a solution to the Nash
Bargaining problem only when the interior solution α∗ is beyond the [0,1] interval, and in
this case equilibrium debt recovery rate is 1. As to the case that ∆L = 0, it has been ruled
out since φ < 1, and the debt holders can always extract some positive surplus from the
bargaining game. Thus, in equilibrium α∗(y,B) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let BR = −αtBt denote the reduced amount of debt
repayment. And we rewrite equation (16) as follows:





29Take derivative of both sides with respect to BR:
∂LHS
∂BR = φu0 + φBRu00(−1) > 0
∂RHS
∂BR = (1 − φ)u0(−1) < 0
So the left-hand-side is an increasing function in BR and the right-hand-side is an decreasing
function in BR. There must be a unique BR∗ such that equation (17) holds with equality.
And that −BR∗ is the threshold value B. When Bt ≤ B, then the equilibrium reduced debt
repayment is B. When Bt > B, there is no debt reduction, since α cannot be larger than
1. This is the case that ∆B = 0 and ∆L > 0. 






B if B ≤ B(y)
1 if B > B(y)
We need to consider 3 cases.
First when B1 ≤ B2 ≤ B(y), then α∗(y,B1) =
B(y)
B1 ≤ B2
B1 = α∗(y,B2). Thus, corollary
holds.
Secondly, when B1 ≤ B(y) ≤ B2 < 0, then α∗(y,B1) =
B(y)
B1 ≤ 1 = α∗(y,B2). Thus,
corollary holds.
Thirdly, when B(y) ≤ B1 ≤ B2 < 0, α∗(y,B1) = α∗(y,B2) = 1. Thus, corollary holds.

Proof of Proposition 3. Given the same BT, it’s straight forward to show that the
value function V (y,0,B) increases in BM. The proof is as follows. When s = 0,
V R(y,0,B)
BM = u0(c∗) > 0
V D(y,0,B)
BM = βEV 0(y0,1,B0)(1 + r) > 0
Thus, the value function V (y,0,B) is increasing in BM, given the same BT. If default is
optimal for B2M, then V D(y,0,B2) ≥ V R(y,0,B2). Since B1M ≤ B2M, V R(y,0,B1) ≤
V R(y,0,B2). In addition, given B1T = B2T, we have α∗(y,B1)B1 = α∗(y,B2)B2 and
30V D(y,0,B1) = V D(y,0,B2). Thus, we have V D(y,0,B1) = V D(y,0,B2) ≥ V R(y,0,B2) ≥
V R(y,0,B1), so default is also optimal for B1M. The ﬁrst half of the proposition is thus
proved.
For the second half, we ﬁrst rewrite the value function of default.
V D(y,0,B) = u((1 − γ)y) + βEu((1 − γ)y0 + α0BT(1 + r) + β2EV (y00,0,0)
Take derivative of V D(y,0,B) with respect to BT:
V D(y,0,B)
BT = Eu0((1 − γ)y + αBT(1 + r))(
∂α
∂B
BT(1 + r) + α(1 + r)) > 0
So V D(y,0,B) is increasing in BT. If default is optimal for B1T, then V D(y,0,B2) ≥
V D(y,0,B1) ≥ V R(y,0,B1). And similarly, we can prove that V R(y,0,B1) ≥ V R(y,0,B2).
Thus, default is also optimal for B2T. And the second half of the proposition is proved. 
Proof of Proposition 4. If debt renegotiation is not a possible option and equilibrium
debt recovery rate α∗ = 0, then default entails permanent autarky. Use V A to denote the
value function of default in this case.




As shown in proof of Proposition 1, V D(y,0,B) > V A(y,0,B) when α∗ is positive. If
default is optimal even without debt renegotiation, then V A(y,0,B) > V RA(y,0,B), where
V RA(y,0,B) denotes the value function of repaying debt when debt renegotiation is not
allowed. Since staying in autarky is a more severe penalty to the country, the budget set
B(y,0,α∗ = 0) ⊇ B(y,0,α∗ > 0), and hence, V RA(y,0,B) > V R(y,0,B) given the same
BM and BT. Therefore, we have V D(y,0,B) > V R(y,0,B) and default is also optimal
when debt renegotiation is allowed. Proposition 4 is thus proved.
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